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LONDON  AND NEW YORK
I do not define time, space, place and motion as being well known to all. But 
it must be observed that the vulgar conceive those quantities only from the 
relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise certain prejudices, 
for the removing of which, it is proper to distinguish them into absolute and 
relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar.
I. Absolute, true and mathematical time, in itself, from its own nature, 
flows equally, without relation to anything external; and by another name 
is called Duration. Relative, apparent, and vulgar time is some sensible and 
external measure of duration by motion, whether accurate or unequable, 
which is commonly used instead of true time; as an hour, a day, a month, a 
year.
Isaac Newton The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy 
(Philosophiae Naturalis, Principia Mathematica). Cambridge, 
Trinity College – July 1687. Scholium page 12
The time of anthropology
When we proposed ‘time’ as the theme of ASA 2016, one of our colleagues 
commented that ‘it had already been done’. It is true that, in terms of 
ASA conferences, ASA 2002 did consider the ‘qualities of time’ and pro-
duced a stimulating volume using the lens of ethnography to reflect on just 
what these qualities are (James and Mills 2005). More dauntingly for us, 
 however, the subject of time has been the focus of sustained and  critical 
scrutiny by a long list of anthropological luminaries. Durkheim, Van 
 Gennep,  Evans-Pritchard, Leach, Levi-Strauss, Gell, Fabian, Munn and 
Bear, to name but a few, have all ‘done’ time, so to speak. If we bring in the 
 philosophical tradition of ‘doing’ time, to which the anthropological one 
is often hitched – here think Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger, Bergson, Russell, 
 McTaggart and many more – the field becomes not only wide but very deep. 
What more is there to say?
Before answering this question, however, a pinch of realism is in order. 
The ‘temporal turn’ which this volume joins and hopefully pushes forward 
is in fact not really a ‘turn’ at all, but a return. As with all claims to intellec-
tual shifts, rethinking and novelty, caution is needed if we are not simply to 
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imbibe old wine in new bottles. The return we have in mind here is to a basic 
repertoire of themes in our efforts to understand time, society and person-
hood and moreover just how these might be brought into an illuminating 
and productive relationship with one another. The themes that are typically 
returned to, can be grouped under three broad perspectives which each treat 
time as the object of enquiry but do so in rather different ways. The first of 
these we gloss as physical time. This is the time that Newton identified in 
the quotation above. This time is about duration and it is inexorable. For ex-
ample, one only has to think of the temporal and irreversible separation be-
tween a cause and its effect to grasp this point. The kind of time that appears 
in this separation is universal and abstract, outside of culture and eternal. 
It is the view from nowhere or rather no particular time. We might think of 
this perspective as anchoring the anthropology of time. The second object 
of  enquiry is social time. Here, we encounter the fact that the apprehension 
of time as duration is always mediated by representations and epistemologies 
that are systematic and shared. The study of temporality here falls squarely 
in the realms of society and culture. Accordingly, this kind of time is taken 
to be relative, multiple and diverse. This is the view from somewhere or some 
particular time. This perspective gives rise to anthropologies of time rather 
than a single, hegemonic anthropology of time. The third perspective places 
phenomenological time at its centre. Here, the emphasis shifts to individual 
experiences of time; how these experiences are created and how they feature 
in each person’s sense of being and becoming as it is shaped under this or 
that set of conditions. This is the view from someone, situated in a particular 
time. This perspective might be thought of as the anthropology of times.
Studies of temporality across the social sciences invariably proceed by a 
triangulation between these cardinal positions. Yet, much as we try to turn 
we are apt to return to the interplay of physical, social and phenomenolog-
ical time in some form or other. An image that might be helpful in getting 
us out of the ‘nothing new under the sun’ dilemma is that of the spiral or 
more precisely the Archimedes’ screw. This beautiful and ubiquitous form 
combines both circularity and temporality. Following the curve of a spiral 
around its fixed central axis, it is possible to arrive at the same point on one 
plane but to have moved forward on another. So, having made clear that 
there is much in what follows in this introduction that is derivative and in-
debted to an important tradition of scholarship on the topic of time, what 
is it that we are offering by way of another turn of the spiral? What is the 
incremental move forward that we are trying to demonstrate?
The present collection emerges out of the ASA 2016 conference, “Foot-
prints and Futures: The time of Anthropology”, held 4–7 July at Durham 
University. One of our hopes for the conference was that in focussing on the 
‘time of anthropology’ (rather than foregrounding the discipline of anthro-
pology as in an ‘anthropology of time’) we might open a discursive space in 
which to reflect on the way that we as anthropologists are folded into the 
temporalities we seek to understand and describe. From within a broad set 
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of concerns about anthropology and temporality presented at the confer-
ence, a particularly strong theme emerged around time and power, that is, 
the study of temporalities that are not merely multiple and parallel (as in an-
thropologies of time) but which are imbricated in the contemporary world in 
ways that are hegemonic and incongruent. The volume expresses the spirit 
of the Durham conference through a series of anthropological case studies 
of how this relationship is worked through in a variety of different settings. 
The thread which connects all these contributions is the concept of chronoc-
racy, a term that draws attention to the ways in which governance is shot 
through with the power to shape the temporalities in which people live out 
their everyday lives. The study of chronocracy thus makes differently visible 
the ways in which inequality and exclusionary practices and the ontological 
and economic insecurity they engender are not just spatial matters but also 
have important temporal dimensions. This leads us to define chronocracy 
as the discursive and practical ways in which temporal regimes are used in 
order to deny coevalness and thereby create deeply asymmetrical relationships 
of exclusion and domination either between humans (in diverse contexts) or 
between humans and other organisms and our ecologies.
In the remainder of this introduction we elaborate on this definition in or-
der to situate our argument within the existing field of anthropological stud-
ies of temporality, to demonstrate how it represents a modest advance on 
existing scholarship and, finally to show how the contributors to the volume 
each in their own way illustrate and take forward the chronocracy thesis.
Analytical traditions – critical genealogies
An important foundation for the anthropological study of time is pro-
vided by the Année Sociologique and specifically the writing of Hubert and 
 Durkheim (Hubert 1905; Durkheim 1915: 11). In this approach, it is the ex-
perience of cycles, rhythms and calendrical events that provides the basis for 
systems of representation. These systems establish time as an entity which 
is fundamentally social and relational in character. The study of such sys-
tems has been the bedrock of anthropological analyses as well as for the 
way other social sciences view time and temporality as an object of enquiry 
(cf. Wallis 1970; Kosseleck 1985; Adam 1990; Klinke 2013). Building on these 
insights, anthropological interests elaborated on systems of time-reckoning 
and measurement. For example, although an approach has been charac-
terised as an ‘empiricist’ one (cf. Rigby 1983; Munn 1992: 96), its emphasis 
on the importance of agricultural activities like gardening, as opposed to 
natural lunar cycles, puts Trobriand ‘time reckoning’ in line with later an-
thropological emphasis on the social and symbolic properties of indigenous 
perceptions of time. Similarly, the notion of time-reckoning was used by 
 Evans-Pritchard in his distinction between ‘oecological time’ and ‘structural 
time’ (1939). Whilst both of these registers refer to social time, the former 
relates more to daily social activities (or what Gell calls the microscopic), 
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while the latter to the political order of genealogies as institutions on a mac-
roscopic scale (cf. Gell 1992: 15, 21).
The subject of time also featured in the works of Levi-Strauss (1963, 1966), 
Leach (1961) and Geertz (1973) among others. However, as Munn notes, up 
until the nineties time was “the handmaiden to other anthropological frames 
and issues” rather than a subject studied for its own sake (1992: 93). This 
observation did not stop Alfred Gell from devoting several chapters and the 
conclusion of The Anthropology of Time (1992) to a systematic criticism of the 
ontological legacies of Durkheim and Bergson that had been so influential 
in anthropological accounts of time up to that point. The main analytical 
weakness in Durkheim’s approach, argued Gell, was a misreading of Kant 
and his attempts to map a series of sociological arguments onto a philosoph-
ical and metaphysical framework (1992: 14). Bergson is also critiqued by Gell 
for his use of the concept of duration as, by extension, is Ingold (1986). Gell’s 
concern is that in much of what passed for the anthropological study of time, 
there is a maladaptation of phenomenology which privileges the order of 
lived-time over the abstract mathematical one (Gell 1992: 314–328).
Gell’s 1992 work has undoubtedly been a major source of orientation 
for anthropological analyses of time since its publication. However, most 
commentators have tended to focus on his notion of temporal maps rather 
than the polemical side of his work (e.g. Hodges 2008, 2010; Bear 2014, 2016; 
 Ringel 2016a). Gell’s concept of time-maps is indeed inspiring and provides 
a point of return throughout the discussions of time and temporality found 
in this volume. For the time-being, however, we would like to examine more 
closely an aspect of Gell’s work that has not received appropriate attention, 
namely his more polemical pronouncements on time and anthropology.
Since the parallel publications of Gell and Munn in 1992, we can trace 
two analytical genealogies in the anthropological literature on time. The 
first, influenced by Gell, emphasises the present, locates diversity at the level 
of multiple understandings and experiences of time, and calls attention to the 
effects of what humans do with time. The second can be traced back through 
Munn to the phenomenological approaches of Bergson and Deleuze. Time 
here is seen as durée which underpins a recognition of the existence of mul-
tiple and imbricated temporalities. We will not attach names to each analyt-
ical genealogy. It seems rather pointless to create a virtual debate between 
scholars who have not felt thus far like debating with each other on the basis 
of the philosophical roots of their respective approaches. Most importantly 
though, frequently these two traditions seem to co-exist in post-2000 liter-
ature that is based on eclectic combinations of ideas and mostly refuses to 
remain faithful to one analytical perspective at the expense of the other – 
turns are often returns! But if this is the case, why do we want to revive 
Gell’s polemic? Let us begin with Gell’s statements which we cite at length:
The aim is not, therefore, to transcend the logic of the everyday, famil-
iar world… There is no fairyland where people experience time in a way 
Introduction 5
that is markedly unlike the way in which we do ourselves, where there 
is no past, present and future, where time stands still, or chases its own 
tail, or swings back and forth like a pendulum… The whole thrust of 
this book has been to insist on a distinction between time and the pro-
cesses which happen in time. I have opposed the trend of thought which 
distinguishes different species and varieties of time on the basis of dif-
ferent types or processes happening in time… The whole point of an ab-
stract category such as ‘time’ is precisely that it provides the means for 
the relative unification of otherwise diverse categories of processes… It 
is merely patronizing to leave exotic ethnographic models of the world 
uncriticised, as if their possessors were children who could be left to 
play forever in an enchanted garden of their own devising… While it 
is certainly true that rituals dramatize time, and even manipulate it… 
this does not mean that calendric festivals either create time or modify 
it, except rhetorically or symbolically… The elusive time which emerges 
from the analysis of ritual categories… cannot be detached from the 
ponderous entropic time of real-world events.
(1992: 314, 315, 324, 326)
The legacy that Alfred Gell left in The Anthropology of Time, we argue, 
goes beyond his inspiring analysis of the cultural construction of temporal 
maps and images. It is apparent between the lines of the entire book, but 
more so in its conclusion which fiercely attacks ‘muddled phenomenology’ 
(1992: 328), yet also alludes to something rather more sinister, namely, the 
political nature of ‘allochronism’ and its deeply asymmetrical effects in our 
ethnographic practice. ‘Allochronism’ is a term coined by Fabian and refers 
to kinds of ethnographic analysis and writing that dis-place the ‘other’ from 
present time thereby denying them coevalness (1983: 32). Fabian, in draw-
ing attention to ‘the time of anthropology’, claimed that anthropological 
discourses can be seen as temporalising, existential, rhetorical and political 
devices that produce (and not just represent) other worlds as living in differ-
ent timelines from that of the ethnographer (ibid.). His work illuminated the 
colonial and imperial sedimentations in the discipline of Anthropology and 
inspired further critical post-colonial thoughts on the asymmetrical effects 
of academic uses of time (cf. Agnew 1996). This problematic is one that the 
present volume returns to as a primary but not yet entirely accounted for 
concern.
Through a unifying approach to time as an organising principle of human 
affairs (1992: 315), Gell sought to banish precisely this allochronism. His 
polemic challenges an anti-rationalism which he saw as entering through 
the back door of phenomenology and Durkheimian-inspired accounts of 
ritualistic time that conflate ‘real time’ with experiences of time. By refus-
ing to accept the existence of different and exotic kinds of time, Gell re-
fused the existence of different and exotic kinds of people who purportedly 
confuse objective reality with their symbolic representations of reality. His 
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distinction between time and the processes that happen in time strives to 
bring us all (informants and anthropologists) into a common present. One 
may argue that Gell’s common present is heavily inspired by an understand-
ing of the ‘real’ as underpinned by notions of scientific objectivity (1992: 328) 
and thus a peculiarly ‘Western’ rationality. We have already implicitly ac-
knowledged and pre-empted this objection through our opening quote from 
Newton’s Principia Mathematica, which we will invite the reader to compare 
with Gell’s ideas about A- and B-series time further on. Whether or not 
Gell is right or wrong in his vision of what this common present entails is a 
secondary matter for our discussion here. What remains is his unequivocal 
antithesis to ontologies that potentially promote non-coevalness, evidenced 
in his firm insistence to bring the ethnographer and the informants in “one 
world, i.e., the real world” (1992: 324). Here, we land squarely in the ‘time 
of anthropology’ and the entanglements of time in the enactment of power 
relations in the contemporary world. In this sense, we keep Fabian’s (1983) 
observations firmly in focus combining them with Gell’s (1992) polemic on 
the nature of allochronism. However, we extend the work of both authors 
beyond the realm of ethnographic practice into the worlds that ethnogra-
phies are set to analyse.
This volume sets out to trace different political technologies of allochro-
nism. We argue that what characterises our common time (the time of 
anthropology and of its diverse sets of informants) is chronocracy and the 
ontological, epistemic, moral, discursive and practical uses of time that deny 
coevalness. Chronocracy thus underpins diverse social processes, often an-
imated by affective sensibilities, that effect deeply asymmetrical relation-
ships of exclusion and domination. This asymmetry might appear between 
humans (in diverse contexts) or indeed between humans and other organ-
isms and our ecologies. In our effort to document experiences and practices 
of chronocracy and to chart its effects, we endorse Bear’s call for an under-
standing of time through human labour (2014) and Das’ observation that 
the “event attaches itself with its tentacles into everyday life and folds itself 
into the recesses of the ordinary” (2006: 1). Acts (or events) of chronocratic 
domination are occasions of disruption and structural violence that spread 
into the everyday lives of human and non-human beings and ecological sys-
tems. Chronocracy, we argue, becomes our ‘everyday’ and structures our 
ordinary experiences to the point that our common time thickens and be-
comes saturated with its effects and our labour to mitigate them.
This volume will offer a variety of ethnographic examples that illustrate 
our approach to time, power and chronocracy. Before we do this however, 
we would like to reassure the ancestral spirit of Alfred Gell that our think-
ing on this topic will remain “open-ended”, “eclectic” and “empirical” (1992: 
328). We read the anthropologists’ efforts to understand time with a flaneur 
mindset, and we treat this volume as an act of labour – another act of labour – 
against chronocracy and its ordinary manifestations. In our work, we will 
use multiple and diverse tools, and it is to those tools that we turn now.
Introduction 7
Anthropological perspectives on time and temporality as instances of 
counter-chronocratic academic labour
Works by Gell and Munn published in 1992 were perhaps the first systematic 
attempts to discuss ‘the abstract production of time and social reproduction’ 
(Bear 2016: 488). Going beyond indigenous perspectives and understandings 
of time, these works explored the ways in which time is implicated in ‘all as-
pects of social experience and practice’ (Munn 1992: 93). As Hodges notes, 
Munn’s approach combined a phenomenological view of time as temporal-
ity with inspirations from practice theory in order to draw our attention to 
embodied experiences of time as the effect of temporalising practices (2008: 
405). Rather than focussing on the notion of abstract time as a backdrop 
of human activity, Munn argues in favour of the notion of temporalisation 
which suggests that time is continually ‘produced’ as a ‘symbolic process’ 
through everyday practices (1992: 116).
Temporalisation is of course far from a neutral process. Acts of temporalis-
ation, as we have argued, can also be violent enactments of chronocracy in so 
far as various discursive and practical regimes can produce diverse temporal-
ities and different social and symbolic timelines that deny coevalness to cer-
tain subjects. Among the primary fields where discussions of the chronocratic 
and hegemonic role of temporalising discourses intensified was that of his-
torical anthropology. Hirsch and Stewart stressed the importance of the role 
of time in structuring human experience as an intersubjective phenomenon 
(2005: 262). Through the notion of historicity – a concept that goes back to 
the philosophies of Heidegger and Ricoeur – they examined the relationships 
we entertain with our pasts and argued against a rigid separation between the 
past, the present and the future (2005: 271, see also Ringel 2016b).
The Western paradigm of historicism, Stewart notes (namely the idea that 
the present succeeds the past in a strict and irreversible manner), is inexo-
rably linked to hegemonic conceptualisations of progress and hierarchical 
distinctions between the past, the present and an ever better future that lies 
ahead (2016: 83–84). This idea is epitomised in historians’ notion of colli-
gation, the ‘tying-together’ of events into patterns that give rise to defined 
periods, such as ages or epochs and which are believed to succeed one an-
other (Walsh 1951). In anthropology, for example, Lewis Henry Morgan, in 
an all-roads-lead-to-us kind of way, talked of an evolution from savagery 
to barbarism to civilisation. Consistent with the Eurocentrism of the time, 
such views placed non-Europeans, not just in a place which was outside of 
modernity but crucially for the arguments we make here, outside the time of 
modernity. Among others, this was JS Mills’ take on global history which, 
as Dipesh Chakrabarty put it, ‘thus consigned Indians, Africans and other 
“rude” nations to an imaginary waiting room of history’ (2000: 8). This was 
chronocratic rule and a denial of coevalness par excellence.
Promoting an anti-historicist ethos of understanding temporal rela-
tions, Hirsch and Stewart (2005) draw our attention to how these different 
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temporal orders are not simply a thing of the past but can actually co-exist 
simultaneously in the present (cf. also Lambek 2002). The ways in which 
temporalities fuse together when ‘segments of the past’ remain ‘contempo-
rary, simultaneous and proximate’ draws attention to the poly- temporal 
character of historical experience (Knight 2015; Knight and Stewart 2016: 5). 
Knight’s ethnography of a town in central Greece, for instance, eloquently 
demonstrates how the past is relevant to everyday life (cf. Sutton 1998) but 
also how the past is actually re-lived in the present (2015).
The onset of the past into the present that causes temporalities to merge 
has been also examined through emphasis on affect (cf. Navaro-Yashin 
2012), objects and materialities that operate not only as lieux de mem-
oir, but literally as embodiments of past lives, of our own and others (cf. 
 Navaro-Yashin 2009, 2012 on Greek-Cypriot homes inhabited by Turkish 
Cypriots after the 1974 partition of the island; Bryant 2014 on the same 
topic of appropriation and redistribution of Greek Cypriot property; Pipy-
rou 2014 on  second-hand clothes; Demetriou 2015 on the evaluation of loss, 
 ruination and preservation through time, Sutton 2001 on food and also 
Hirsch and Spitzer 2010 among others). We view all such anthropological 
efforts to combat historicism by identifying the ‘elastic’ properties of time 
in indigenous discursive, practical and material instantiations of historicity 
(cf. Knight and Stewart 2016) as explicitly counter-chronocratic acts or else 
as instances of  counter-chronocratic academic labour that seeks to mediate 
the effects of temporalisation as chronopolitical violence and to reinstate 
coevalness at different levels of analysis.
The temporalising effects of historical time as differentiated time, a facet 
of contemporary chronocracy, have been discussed in detail in the work of 
Koselleck (1985). By examining the period between 1500 and 1800,  Koselleck 
argues that two distinct processes took place: the separation between natu-
ral time and historical time and the monopolisation of notions of the future 
by the state. These processes are intimately connected to the genesis of the 
concept of progress as a singular, future-oriented order,  animated by ideas 
about direction and improvement (ibid.). From 1500 to 1800,  Koselleck 
notes that there were steady efforts on behalf of states to banish all kinds of 
astrological and religiously inspired predictions of the future (1985: 16–17). 
Simultaneously, history became temporalised and detached itself from a 
naturally formed chronology (ibid.: 33). The result of the former processes 
was the production of future as an unknown entity that could only be ne-
gotiated through ‘progress’ instigated and engineered by human actors who 
took control – so to speak – of their timelines (Koselleck 1985: 17–18). The 
result of the latter process (the temporalisation of history) was the formula-
tion of specific concepts of political and social revolution. Political revolu-
tion acquired an ‘objective’ and a telos: the ‘social emancipation of all men’ 
and the ‘transformation of social structure’ (1985: 48). Social revolution 
forced the ‘writing off’ of the past and fed itself singlehandedly from notions 
of the future (ibid.: 51). Progress emerged as a collective singular order (and 
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in its singular linguistic form – as opposed to progresses) towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, a period that heralded the divide between past and 
present, ‘previous experience and coming expectation’ (1985: 257).
The singularisation of history that Koselleck describes supported the 
emergence of a hegemonic, internally differentiated timeline characterised 
by a specific direction towards future horizons and imbued with expecta-
tions of progress as improvement of our existential, ethical, political and 
social conditions. Western historicism is then one of the building blocks 
of chronocracy, since this hegemonic timeline functions as a chronotope 
(cf. Bakhtin 1981): namely, as virtual space that “becomes charged and re-
sponsive to movements of time, plot and history” (ibid.: 84). Chronotopes 
are timescapes filled with tied and untied knots of narrative (Bakhtin 1981: 
250), where the dimension of time becomes visible (Bear 2014: 7) and where 
time becomes spatialised. The hegemonic chronotope of periodised his-
tory and future-oriented understandings of progress is a manifestation of 
chronocracy because it is a timescape from which persons and communities 
can be dis-located. As suggested above, falling out of the place of modernity, 
progress, development and directional social evolution is of course one of 
the most salient forms of being denied coevalness. In turn, anthropological 
works that emphasise the existence of multiple temporalities (cf. Birth 2008; 
Nielsen 2014; Knight 2014) and manage to disturb the hegemonic  ordering 
of time are examples of counter-chronocratic labour. We view them not as 
instances of ‘obscurantist’, ‘anti-rational denunciations’ of objective time 
(to remember Alfred Gell again, 1992: 328), but as distinctly decolonising 
 efforts to challenge chronopolitical hegemonies, through epistemic and 
even scientific disobedience (cf. Mignolo 2009).
Of similar character to the efforts of historical anthropologists, men-
tioned thus far (only indicatively, since there are many–many others who 
cannot be meaningfully discussed in the space of an introduction), is the 
work of scholars who have tried to problematise notions of hope and future. 
Hope as a faculty of the imagination and as a process indexical to poten-
tially realisable futures has been inspirationally explored by Ernst Bloch 
(1986). Based on concepts defined by Aristotle in Poetics, Bloch proclaimed 
that the “real is a process” of “mediation between present, unfinished past 
and above all possible future” (ibid.: 196). Aristotle argues in favour of a 
certain unity between reality and potentiality, existing matter and the pos-
sibility of materialisation of concrete forms (evident his concept of dynamei 
on, or what Bloch translates as what-is-in-possibility, 1986: 207). What is 
‘possible’ for Aristotle (dynaton) is also real (alithes), and therefore it could 
be argued that the reality of the present is on a par with the realisability of 
the future.1 It follows that actions completed (or actualised) and actions that 
remain yet unfinished in the realm of potentiality form a continuum filled 
with contingency. The continuity between potential and actual, also known 
as Aristotelian entelechy, allows us to claim that there can be no hard divi-
sion between factual reality and the ‘not yet’ (cf. Bloch 1986: 201). The ‘not 
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yet’ is a characteristic of a vision of the real that incorporates both actual-
ity and potentiality and destabilises hard distinctions between present and 
future temporalities (cf. also Crapanzano 2004: 14). Entelechy renders hope 
a kind of method that informs people’s actions in the present (actuality) as 
these are underpinned by visions of an indeterminate future (potentiality) 
(cf. Munn 1992: 115; Miyazaki 2004, 2006; Simpson 2013).
The connections between hope and the indeterminacy of potentiality are 
carefully examined by Bryant and Knight who argue that hope can be seen 
as a dynamic process of becoming and of positive movement (2019: 157). 
Hope as a means of gazing at the present through the future is way of ori-
enting the self within time (ibid.: 19, Hodges 2010: 125). The open-ended, 
indeterminate character of the future fills our present with a ‘plethora of ori-
entations’ (Bryant and Knight 2019: 192) and affords us a certain temporal 
agency through ‘tricking time’ (Ringel 2016a). This kind of temporal agency 
springs from the contingencies of the everyday; it indicates that subjectifi-
cation is an open-ended, unfinished, social, temporal and relational project 
(cf. Kirtsoglou 2004). We are constantly becoming within time, within un-
bounded temporalities where pasts, presents and futures bleed into each 
other. Our present is inhabited with many possible futures, that may or may 
not become our ‘life projects’, but always remain indexical of the immen-
sity of life as an adventure (cf. Rapport 2017). Our futures are saturated 
with present projections, hopes and desires, while our pasts are constantly 
subjected to recursive and retro-causal readings. As Veena Das argues, our 
efforts to ‘put together a life’, often in the face of previous suffering and 
devastation, take place as “events are being carried forward and backward 
in time on the register of the everyday” (2006: 218, also 211, 215). Indeed, 
our temporal agency, so intimately connected with the potentiality of future 
becomings, is primarily exercised through ordinary, everyday actions.
However, the manner of this backward and forward movement is not 
merely a matter of agency. It is also governed by what we have begun to 
sketch out as contemporary chronocracies. In other words, entelechy (the 
continuity between actuality and potentiality) should not be mistaken for a 
soteriological exercise in volitionality. It is precisely in the confusion between 
the registers of the actual and the potential that we become locked in struc-
tures of waiting, delay and suspension (cf. Crapanzano 2004: 115; Baraitser 
2017, Hage 2009). As Guyer has it, we become subjected to “the disciplines 
of a punctuated time that fills the gap between an instantaneous present and 
an altogether different, distant future” (cf. Guyer 2007). Through examples 
from other analyses of the temporality of lived economies (most notably: 
 Ferguson’s 1999 work on despair, Williams’ 2004 work on debt and Roit-
man’s 2005 observations on fiscal disobedience), Guyer has persuasively ar-
gued in favour of the connection between the religious time of fundamentalist 
Evangelical Christianity and the capitalist time of monetarist projection and 
prophesy (2007: 411). The future is being structured, Guyer argues, through 
“formal calendrics of financial debt and benefit, self-renewal as a citizen, 
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or insistent work schedules” (ibid.). Punctuated time, enacted mercilessly in 
audit cultures (Strathern 2000), structures of indebtedness (Han 2012), or 
liberal notions of self-governance (Lester 2017), empties futures (Dzenovska 
2018) and produces feelings of nostalgia (Narotzky 2016) and exhaustion 
(Knight 2016). Under these conditions, hope should not be mistaken for a 
manifestation of potentiality. It becomes a coping mechanism (Berlant 2011; 
Narotzky and Besnier 2014; Bryant and Knight 2019: 154), a kind of deferral 
of the present into the future that dis-locates and dis-places social actors. It 
does not only deny them their coevalness but also the very sense of existing in 
some realistic and meaningful timeframe. This specific facet of chronocracy 
renders hope not a positive experience of immanence and potentiality but a 
timescape that functions as an appendix of reality. What cannot exist in real 
time (people, relations, aspirations) is forced to inhabit the chronotope of 
hope, that is, the hope that somewhere down the line there is a future capable 
of accommodating it. Hope as refuge from chronocracy is a bordered time-
space inhabited by postponed dreams and palliative thoughts of populations 
configured as superfluous (such as migrants cf. Agier 2011, or the urban poor 
cf. Palomera 2014) or as predestined failures (Evans 2007).
The openness of future possibilities is further entangled with the vio-
lence of chronocracy in ways closely related to speed and movement. As 
Koselleck notes, ‘delay’ has become a ‘key historical principle’, employed 
both by conservative forces that wish to hold back movement and by pro-
gressive ones who want to accelerate it (1985: 257). The notion of speed as 
the organising temporal norm of modernity has been extensively discussed 
by Virilio who argued that geopolitical relations have been substituted by 
chronopolitical ones, which increasingly favour systems of ‘instantaneous 
transmission’ (1989, 1991: 16). The compression of time-space through cul-
tures of speed and acceleration (cf. Dalsgaard and Nielsen 2013; Bear 2014: 
3, 2016: 488; Ringel 2016a: 28; Baraitser 2017), in combination with tech-
nologies of communication, forces us to think of chronocracy in terms of a 
post-humanism as “a distributed property of the relations between people 
and things” (Ingold 2010; Bear 2014: 7; Yarrow 2015: 32). Rather than time-
space compression, we may be seeing its distension.
Chronocracy, as effected (paradoxically) through ‘real-time’ connected-
ness, is radically re-ordering the politics of allochronism. Virilio notes the 
emergence of global ‘metacities’ (2000: 11) ‘hyper connected’ between each 
other through points of communication but also through terminals of con-
trol and surveillance that exchange data and information in real time (2005: 
95). These global metacities have changed the rules of non-coevalness from 
historical/spatial (developed versus developing countries) to virtual (Virilio 
2005). As James notes, at the same time that some people “labour in the 
fields, factories, sweatshops and mines of the former colonial centres… the 
elites of those same countries work in digitally connected and Western-style 
urban districts… often situated in close proximity to makeshift slums or 
shanty towns” (2007: 100).
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Virilio’s observations regarding the tyranny of real time (1993: 283) of-
fer significant insights to our understanding of time, chronocracy and lack 
of coevalness. The present afforded by post-industrial modernity is not an 
order that can be conceptualised in terms of abstract, mathematical (or 
‘ natural’) time. Any physicist located in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on April 24, 
2013, just before the collapse of a sweatshop that cost the lives of more than 
one thousand people, would have assured us that all workers there lived 
in the same timeline with high-end traders at the Dhaka stock-exchange 
building (for example). The same is of course true for the case of London 
on the day of the Grenfell tower fire, and Lesbos, Greece, in 2015, when 
Syrian refugees were losing their lives just off the shores where European 
tourists were enjoying their all-inclusive holidays. Yet we know that this 
kind of ‘contemporaneity’ is very much meaningless. Living in the same 
clock-time, or even in the same broad space in terms of physical geography, 
means very little in terms of inhabiting a common, coeval present. We live 
in a fragmented world composed of timescapes of modern versus backward, 
and primitive versus advanced, underpinned by historical concepts of pro-
gress, growth and development (Agnew 1996: 31–32). This is a new kind of 
orientalism (cf. Kirtsoglou 2010a; Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2016) and one 
that sustains non-congruent worlds and produces neo-colonial subjects. 
The neo- and crypto-colonised are forced to live in the timelines of others 
(cf. Herzfeld 2002). Their own timelines are being rendered meaningless as 
they are caught in webs of capital circulation and accumulation and in the 
speed cultures of growth, excellence, debt and structural adjustment at the 
height of post-industrialised modernity.
Chronocracy – all those economic, political, historical forces that 
keep people in different timescapes – makes even more sense through the 
 Aristotelian distinction between zoe (unqualified bare life) and bios (social 
life embedded in the body politic) as exemplified through the writings of 
Arendt (1958) and later Agamben (1998). Our zoe (or zoes in plural) may be 
unfolding in the same mathematical time but our bios (or bioi in plural) is 
not. Temporality, as an order, allows us to grasp the distinction between 
where we live our zoe and where we experience (or become stripped of) our 
bios. Past, present and future need to be understood therefore not as social 
elaborations of the before and after of mathematical time but as timescapes 
of the political, produced by different chronocratic regimes.
Another look at conceptualisations of time and their consequences 
for the concept of chronocracy
Our efforts to explicate and contextualise the notion of chronocracy is in 
line with the considerable academic labour that has gone into recording the 
global manifestations of what Bear calls the heterochrony of our time (2014: 
6). Our fundamental contention is that the workings of chronocracy force 
certain people to live in different timelines from others, or obliges them to 
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live in the timelines of others, or ostracises them from all meaningful time-
lines confining them to the chronotope of hope as a coping mechanism and 
a refuge from the present.
We would now like to invite the reader to take another look at our opening 
quotation from Newton’s Principia Mathematica while trying to mentally 
‘zoom in’ to the world in 1687, the time of Principia’s publication. Native 
Americans had already been decimated, the transatlantic slave-trade was 
well established, and in Stuart Britain (1603–1714), the majority of people 
lived in extreme poverty, many relying on charity to survive (cf. Zuvich 
2016). The 1666 great fire of London had already happened and we are only 
a year away from the Glorious Revolution which transformed Britain into a 
commercial society with the foundation of the Bank of England in 1694 (cf. 
Wennerlind 2011).
Isaac Newton was living in the timescape of Trinity College, Cambridge, 
and it is from there, sometime between 1665 and 1667, that he wrote the 
scholium in question. In just a few words, Newton draws a hard line between 
absolute, true time and vulgar time, proclaiming that the vulgar conceive [the 
quantities of time, space, place and motion] only from the relation they bear 
to sensible objects. In Newton’s scholium, vulgar people (i.e. ordinary, com-
mon people) acquire their own separate timeline, that is, the ‘vulgar time’, 
which (as opposed to true time) is relative and measured by motion. On that 
summer day when Isaac Newton signed the Principia, he sealed the distinc-
tion between mathematical ‘objective’ time and the time of subjective expe-
rience. He also, willingly or unwillingly, constructed a specific chronotope 
out of the combination of ‘vulgar time’ and ‘vulgar people’ who were thus 
produced as a class distinct from scientists but not just in social, economic, 
or historical terms. Because the vulgar could only conceive time relationally, 
their difference from the likes of Isaac Newton is seen as being primarily a 
cognitive one. The vulgar were not only traded as slaves, killed, annihilated 
by wars and disease, or destined to live in poverty. They were also constituted 
as cognitively different to certain other classes of their contemporaries, and 
they were denied coevalness with them precisely on the basis of a cognitive 
difference read as a legitimated inferiority. Nothing less than the foundation 
stones of the waiting room of history were laid in Newton’s Principia.
We now invite the reader to fast-forward 304 years later, when ( presumably 
at his office on the third floor of Connaught House at the LSE) Alfred 
Gell is writing The Anthropology of Time. Drawing on the late nineteenth- 
century British philosopher of time, John McTaggart (1927), Gell distin-
guishes B- series time from A-series time. B-series time corresponds to the 
‘real’  nature of scientific time, it lacks tenses and is characterised only by a 
binary distinction between ‘before’ versus ‘after’. For example, ASA 2015 
happened before ASA 2016. A-series on the other hand, reflects subjective 
time- consciousness and is organised in past, present and future (1992: 157). 
The ASA conference we organised which was experienced as in the present 
in 2016 is now in the past. The absolute, objective time of the B-series, exists 
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independently from the subjective personal or collective experience of time 
of the A-series. Our perceptions of time do not change in any way as we 
flip between these two ways of apprehending time, Gell argues (ibid.: 158). 
Yet, as Hodges notes, Gell’s B-series is a ‘metaphysical statement’ about real 
time, the order that provides “an objective ground for, and structure to, the 
world and its history” (2008: 406).
The model of A- versus B-series of time which Gell drew up is in many 
ways reminiscent of the Newtonian distinction between subjective and ob-
jective time presented in the Principia. Unlike Newton however, Gell was an 
anthropologist, which means that he probably shared most anthropologists’ 
allergic reaction to vulgar allochronism. Thus, his distinction between ob-
jective and subjective time is complemented with an analytically robust case 
in favour of the idea that all human beings, all people, have the capacity to 
conceptualise time in both its objective and subjective manifestations. This 
is because, as a matter of logical principle Gell argues, all actions carry op-
portunity costs that are understood by all agents who are forced to perform 
one action at the expense of another (1992: 216–218, 322). We all inhabit the 
‘real world’, Gell concludes, because we all understand that we cannot both 
perform and at the same time not perform the same action (1992: 323).
Apart from arguing a persuasive case against allochronism and cognitive 
difference as inferiority, Gell goes on to explain how we conceptualise these 
two different series of time. A-series subjective time is understood, he states, 
as a flux of images (1992: 236), through which we “interact with ‘real’ time 
via the mediation of temporal maps (ibid.: 239). This is because the temporal 
territory of objective, B-series time, is inaccessible to us since “physically 
speaking, each one of us is only another smear of events” that belong to the 
same category as the B-series events that we want to grasp (1992: 239). In 
this sense, ‘time is us’ (ibid.). The temporal maps we construct in order to 
navigate B-time are only representations, surrogates and reconstructions of 
a real, and otherwise, noumenal time (1992: 235–240).
Gell’s assertion that ‘time is us’ goes a step beyond counter-allochronism 
to turning cognitive hierarchical categorisations between communities, 
 societies and individuals on their head. Our (hopefully fresh) reading of his 
work suggests that his A- and B-series time and his notion of temporal maps 
do not just categorically preclude the existence of a class of people who 
only live in ‘vulgar’ chronotopes where objective time is confused with our 
representations of it. More importantly, the accessibility of B-series time 
only through temporal maps persuasively demonstrates that there exists no 
cognitively superior class of people who can step outside objective time (or 
spacetime after Einsteinian physics) in order to have unmediated access to 
the phenomenon as a fundamental quantity. It transpires that we all access 
(space)time through temporal maps and other representational techniques 
such as mathematical models and two-dimensional diagrams, which employ 
shading in order to create the illusion of a four-dimensional continuum in 
visual representations. The notion of temporal maps is therefore exegetic 
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but also indexical to our common cognitive capacities and limitations, and 
as such, it is a deeply revolutionary anti-chronocratic concept.
Bear (2014, 2016) builds on the concept of time-maps in order to draw our 
attention to their economic, bureaucratic, social and political uses. She pin-
points the existence of diverse representations and rhythms of human and 
non-human time (2014: 6) and the hierarchical ordering of time-maps within 
society (ibid.: 17). Echoing Althusser, she observes that there is a ‘disloca-
tion’ of different temporalities produced at different structural levels (2014: 
19) and proposes that we begin to understand time as ‘labour’ (ibid.: 6). We 
have fully endorsed this proposition here as we appreciate the fact that in 
its conceptual and practical qualities, labour manages to assemble together 
temporal agency, but also our creativity in striving to mediate and reconcile 
temporal disparities (1992: 20).
Elaborating further on the concept of time-maps and based on the 
 Aristotelian distinction between techne (technique), episteme (knowledge) 
and phroneses (ethics), Bear claims that our actions, techniques, knowl-
edges and ethics of time have poetic qualities, as they skilfully produce social 
worlds and connect them with ‘nonhuman processes’ (2016: 489–490). What 
we find particularly useful here for putting together the puzzle of chronocracy 
is Bear’s observation that in capitalist modernity, the techniques, knowledge 
and ethics of time form into assemblages of dominant and less dominant 
time-maps in technologies of imagination (ibid.: 496). We use this insight to 
argue that chronocracy depends on hierarchically ordered assemblages to 
produce disparate affordances of the social and the political. Chronocracy, 
as we have identified it here, maps closely onto Bear’s varieties of temporal 
representation. Chronocracy as a technology produces ‘spatiotemporal ine-
quality’ through the accumulation of different orders of capital (2016: 496). As 
a ‘hierarchy of expertise’ (ibid.), chronocracy creates allochronisms, while as 
an ethic it can produce asymmetrical moral economies inspired by neoliberal 
visions of progress as a historical and moral telos.
Studies in contemporary chronopolitics: documenting  
and mediating chronocracy
Our exploration in contemporary chronocracy opens with Michael 
 Jackson’s essay on existential mobility and multiple selves. Jackson bases his 
analysis on life stories of African migrants collected during several years 
of fieldwork in London, Amsterdam and Copenhagen. Accessing worlds 
through the window afforded by a single life is an established method in an-
thropology and specifically in relation to the anthropology of time.  Irving, 
for example, offers the notion of ‘life journeys’ in which he combines  physical 
movement in space, maps and narrative. He eloquently exemplifies not only 
the indeterminacy of the future but also the thickness and complexity of our 
temporalities as these are subject to constant reinterpretations and recursive 
readings (2017: 27–28 also see 2016).
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Jackson’s method here does not involve physical movement or time-maps 
but produces equally rich evidence of our poly-spatio-temporal existence; 
the self appears as ‘several rather than singular’. Thus, we are allowed a 
glimpse into the life story of Ibrahim from Burkina Faso. Ibrahim moved 
from West Africa to Holland and consequently from a patrimonial regime 
where his destiny was determined by face to face relationships to a bureau-
cratic regime of governance through impersonal structures. Jackson tells 
how Ibrahim had a photo of his father prominently hanging on a wall of his 
room, but every time he was consuming alcohol he felt like running out of 
the room, not being able to stand his father’s gaze. The point is a powerful 
one. Ibrahim may have moved places and thereby become ‘dis-membered’ 
from his familiar community, but he still inhabited the temporality of his 
homeland, immanent in his father’s gaze. As Jackson notes, Ibrahim oscil-
lated between a concern for his father’s expectations, his wife and daughter 
in Holland and his personal ambition to become educated. Ibrahim’s story 
illustrates a kind of poly-spatio-temporality. It is filled with past, intimate, 
religious and kinship time (cf. Cannell and McKinnon 2013; Bear 2014), 
present, kinship and social time and future orientations of hope and ambi-
tion. Ibrahim’s experience attests to Gell’s claim that ‘each one of us is only 
another smear of events’ (1992: 239).
Jackson’s contribution demonstrates how the poly-spatio-temporality 
as an existential condition produces multiple selves, full of discontinuities 
stemming from the imperative to navigate opportunity costs (cf. Gell 1992) 
and the ethical dilemmas of becoming (cf. Das 2006: 76–77).
Jackson’s essay also offers an empirical and analytical substantiation 
of chronocracy and what it means for people to try to bridge incongruent 
temporalities. At the empirical level, we can see how the migrant is being 
dis-located from the timeline of the full citizen and forced to inhabit an 
‘inscrutable and Kafkaesque world’ of bureaucratic indifference, locked 
into structures of waiting that he attempts to mediate though hope and an-
ticipation. ‘The migrant is obliged to re-member himself like a bricoleur’, 
Jackson notes, and through acts of skilful labour he morphs into a new as-
semblage ‘from the various aspects of his past and present selves’ (cf. Bear 
2016: 489–490).
Jackson also speaks directly to chronocracy in its epistemic form. He 
draws a parallel between the culturalist reduction of reality to ‘preconceived 
ontological categories’ (cf. Gell 1992), and the racist reduction of a whole 
person to the colour of his skin, religion, nationality or history. By stressing 
the human capacity for ‘strategic shape-shifting’ and the ‘existential imper-
ative to discover and create one’s own ground’, Jackson reminds us of the 
humanistic anthropology of Rapport (2012, 2017 indicatively).
The epistemic face of chronocracy is also taken up in the second con-
tribution offered by Peter Wade who addresses the spatio-temporal nar-
ratives of human population genomics. What Wade gives us is a powerful 
example of how chronocracy is productive of new concepts and ‘superior 
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truths’ in the form of expert of knowledges that temporalise human history 
and action (cf. Koselleck 1985: 257). Human evolution, Wade explains, is 
chiefly represented by two kinds of scientific narratives: the spatiotempo-
ral genealogical tree that supports the ‘out of Africa’ theory and the net/
rhizome model adopted by multiregional theory. Through an arborial met-
aphor of branches that shoot out from each other, the tree metaphor pre-
sents a  vision of ‘human unity in diversity’. The idea of genetic unity, Wade 
observes,  entails a certain anti-racist orientation in its emphasis on our 
common  origins (from the trunk of the tree), and yet it also recognises and 
geneticises racial difference between continental populations (represented 
as separate branches). Through the image of the tree, population genomic 
science constructs a theory of evolution ‘in which human populations de-
veloped in  specific,  continent-sized environmental niches, through natural 
selection and endogamy’. Apart from reducing reality to representation 
(cf. also  Jackson this volume), the way that the tree image spatialises and 
 temporalises  human difference is associated, Wade argues, with ‘linearity, 
hierarchy, racism and rigidity’.
The net/rhizome model is heavily influenced by the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987). This image affords a temporal and political representation 
that traces unity in ‘constant flows across space and time’ (Wade this vol-
ume; cf. Hodges 2008, 2010). Multiregional theory, Wade notes, allows for 
the ‘re-imaging of evolution in post-Darwinian terms as a rhizome of life’ 
and offers a much ‘less reified concept of the population’. The tree image, 
on the other hand, constitutes an epistemic chronocracy, effected through 
the temporalisation of human movement across time. Similarly, the aca-
demic labour invested to compose an alternative, rhizomic representation 
of evolution as a ‘heterogenous mass of connections’ (Wade this volume) 
is an obvious counter-chronocratic act. Apart from speaking so closely to 
the concept of chronocracy, Wade’s chapter also offers an example of how 
scientists too are forced to work with B-series-type representations of ‘real’ 
time (cf. Gell 1992). Both the tree and the rhizome are effectively temporal 
maps, constructions of the passage of time and of movement across space. 
In this sense, Wade’s contribution can be also read as an explicit attack on 
scientific/epistemic allochronism and its effects on debates about race and 
genetics.
Moving on from epistemic chronocracy into chronocracy as an insti-
tutional technology, Laszczkowski provides us with a view of the role of 
affect, indeterminacy and entelechy in the conflict between incongruent 
timescapes. The ethnography is situated in La Maddalena, west of  Turin, 
where potentially lethal, carcinogenic asbestos was released during a 
tunnel construction. Laszczkowski demonstrates the institutional way of 
dealing with the risk of disease and death by reformulating it through the 
use of statistics and legal regulations regarding ‘concentration limits’. Just 
as the author establishes the biopolitical (and potentially thanatopoliti-
cal) effects of governmentality on the body, he also traces contradictions 
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inherent in the workings of the state. Through documenting the work of 
activists in transforming risk from a ‘numerical value into a virtual, yet 
concrete, embodied reality’, Laszczkowski elaborates on the continui-
ties between the virtual and the actual (cf. Hodges 2008: 410). Following 
the works of Mitchell (1999) and Harvey (2005), the chapter articulates 
an argument about the state as ‘a network of overlapping apparatuses’ 
and ‘a volatile and contingent effect of loosely coordinated practices and 
discourses’.
This chapter resonates with works on the contested temporalities of ur-
ban planning (cf. Abram and Weszkalnys 2013), environmental politics 
(Mathews and Barnes 2016), anthropologies of affect (cf. Navaro-Yashin 
2012; Laszczkowski and Reeves 2017) and on the relationship between mate-
riality and temporality (cf. Bryant 2014). In terms of the concept of chronoc-
racy, Laszczkowski’s contribution evidences the chronocratic character of 
governmentality, as this transpires through its biopolitical and thanatopo-
litical authority. The ‘loosely coordinated practices and discourses’ and 
the affective tensions through which the state materialises are saturated 
with chronocratic capacities. Manifestations of the state fill futures with 
fantasies of development, but also with the possibility of destruction and 
death (cf. Pink and Salazar 2017: 18). The case of La Maddalena reminds 
us of Das’ observation on how “cosmologies of the powerless hold… the 
sheer contingency of events responsible for the disorder of their lives” 
(1995: 139). Although the potentially lethal effects of asbestos will be ex-
perienced at the level of individual bodies, “those bodies bear the stamp 
of the authority of society upon the docile bodies of its members” (ibid.: 
138). Laszczkowski’s contribution showcases how chronocracy is sometimes 
located in “decision events” (Humphrey 2008: 374 in Knight and Stewart 
2016: 10) that create asymmetrical timelines between decision-makers and 
those who are forced to bear the consequences of other people’s decisions 
(see also  Kirtsoglou, Widger and Wickramasinghe in this volume). In care-
fully pointing out ruptures, tensions and moments of indeterminacy where 
the state is ‘both  materialised and undone’, Laszczkowski too engages in 
counter- chronocratic academic labour that charts the conditions and effects 
of institutional ways of producing non-coeval timescapes.
The theme of contested temporalities of urban planning is further ex-
plored in Ringel’s paper on the relationship between expectations and 
politics in the urban settings of the post-industrial era (cf. Abram 2014, 
2017). The ethnography tells us about the German city of Bremerhaven, 
which after a period of industrial development fell into economic decline, 
high  unemployment and increasing poverty. Following the reception of 
investment funding from the Federal level, officials and citizens opted for 
 economic  diversification and invested into turning the harbour city into a 
tourist space. The ‘catchword’ of the city’s strategies was ‘sustainability’, 
and, as Ringel astutely points out, in the context of the post-industrial era, 
‘sustainability has itself to be sustained’.
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Ringel’s paper demonstrates that infrastructures ‘establish temporal 
sensitivities and common rhythms through which life should be lived and 
 understood’ (Widger & Wickramasinghe this volume; cf. also Dalakoglou 
2010; Reeves 2016). His chapter discusses the relationship between poli-
tics and expectations as these literally materialise in urban infrastructural 
transformations as future-oriented events that have the capacity to structure 
everyday lives (cf. Guyer 2007). Elaborating on the recent work of  Dzenovska 
and De Genova (2018), Ringel notes how political action enacts visions of 
the future as ‘progress’ which is, in turn, evidenced by change. However, the 
work of maintenance and continuity, he argues, is a ‘radical political act’. 
Ringel contrasts local German efforts to maintain, to sustain and to repair 
with ‘anthropology’s urge for change’. His observations on the connection 
between ‘change’ and hierarchical ideas of progress as telos remind us of 
Navaro-Yashin’s argument on the politics of knowledge production (2009). 
Echoing Kuhn’s (1970) work on how scientific revolutions and ‘paradigm 
shifts’ are characterised by a tendency to “associate progress in knowledge 
with the defeat of previous frameworks”, Navaro-Yashin notes that innova-
tion in knowledge is related to “the ruination of past approaches” (2009: 7).
Anthropological analyses of chronopolitics, Ringel rightly argues, need 
to keep a firm focus on the question of ‘whose times and whose politics 
are we talking about’. He further draws our attention to state-led and in-
stitutional ways of addressing incongruent temporalities through invest-
ment: a chronocratic notion expectant with ideas of change as progress. As 
 Kirtsoglou (this volume) also demonstrates, a city, a country or a commu-
nity is chronocratically deemed (or shall we say ‘diagnosed’) as existing in 
a different timescape at the very moment that financial support is provided 
to it in order for it to overcome its purported economic and structural lag. 
Investing (and lending) is thus a form of financial chronocracy that forces 
communities to accept their heterochronic existence and imposes on them 
all sorts of political and ethical dilemmas of how they are supposed to 
remedy their condition. In the ethnographic case of Germany examined in 
Ringel’s chapter, officials and citizens struggle with chronocracy through 
the potentially anti-chronocratic vision of sustainability and maintenance 
and a ‘certain stubborn clinging to and investment in old forms’ (Ringel 
in this volume). The connection of academic narratives of excellence and 
innovation with chronocratic acts of ruination of older forms of knowledge 
is the second important insight into the political and epistemic facets of 
chronocracy that this chapter offers. Speaking to emerging literatures on 
‘slowing down’ (cf. Pink and Lewis 2014; Bowles 2016), Ringel’s contribu-
tion is a  direct call for political and academic labour against the effects of 
chronocracy as speed, progress and change.
Slowing-down, waiting and enduring as explicit forms of counter- 
chronocracy are examined in the work of Salisbury and Baraitser’s chap-
ter on psychoanalytic care. The authors examine the implications of a 
particular strand of phenomenological psychiatry in the formulation of 
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psychoanalytic chronic time that attempts to mediate modern speed- 
cultures (cf. Virilio 2005). In a pointed and theoretically nuanced analy-
sis, Salisbury and Baraitser demonstrate how melancholia and depression 
have come to be understood through particular imaginaries of modernity as 
stagnation and suspension. The chapter offers extremely useful insights to 
our discussion of chronocracy and waiting, as it illuminates the affirmative 
dimensions of waiting that our approach has thus far sorely missed. The 
arguments presented here remind us of Koselleck’s observation (discussed 
earlier, 1985: 10–11, 16–17) that the abandonment of predictive and eschato-
logical narratives (between 1500 and 1800) led to state-controlled concepts 
of the future and the emergence of the notion of unidirectional progress. 
Medieval messianic waiting, Salisbury and Baraitser note, was a form of 
‘protracted immanence’ that structured waiting ‘leading to its implicit value 
in eschatological time’. The gradual retreat of messianic waiting in moder-
nity, and the radically different conceptualisations of future as progress 
and accelerated time that emerged, “abbreviated the space of experiences 
[and] robbed them of their constancy” (Koselleck 1985: 17). As Salisbury 
and Baraitser pointedly observe, chronocratic historical processes associ-
ated with the era of modernity foster an idiom of ‘waiting for, rather than 
waiting with time’. The chronicity of psychic life and the timelessness of the 
unconscious were thus seen by Freud as a kind of ‘absence of time’. The psy-
choanalytic approach that the authors explicate however nurtures a notion 
of chronic time that renders prolonged waiting a healing, restorative and 
indeed counter-chronocratic experience. In this sense, the chapter not only 
speaks directly to the main concept of the volume but also adjusts, improves 
and enriches our understandings of waiting and delay.
Moving from the timelessness and the chronicity of psychic life onto 
‘timeliness’, agricultural constraints, management strategies and cli-
matic forces, we will now examine Widger and Wickramasinghe’s paper. 
Significantly, this chapter offers insights on the workings of chronocracy 
in development contexts and a much-welcome ethnographic move from 
 European settings to Sri Lanka. Their focus is the Mahaweli Development 
and  Irrigation Project (MDIP), a non-urban, non-industrial kind of infra-
structure which exposes the limited applicability of theoretical engagements 
with (post)modern time (itself a restricted ecology) for our understandings 
of ‘anthropogenic climate change’ and ‘expansive ecologies of time’. The 
MDIP project, ‘rooted in a modernist concept of industrial time’ did not 
manage to map successfully onto local agricultural rhythms and their spe-
cific irrigation needs. Its attempts to ‘discipline peasant farmers to work 
within the demands of intensified agricultural production’ by controlling 
the tempo of irrigational infrastructures were only partly successful. But 
while MDIP schedulers saw Mahaweli farmers as ‘quite literally falling 
out of time’ (original emphasis), the authors suggest that “the part-time 
 modernity of the Mahaweli is not indicative of a failed attempt to impose a 
full-time modernity”, but a ‘ physico-temporal representation’ of how water 
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and fertilisers coincided. Widger and Wickramasinghe view chemical fer-
tilisers as ‘hyper-objects’, namely entities with temporal dimensions that 
protrude into human  consciousness. The assemblage of agricultural tem-
poralities and environments, local habits, rhythms and hyper-objects such 
as  chemical  fertilisers, produces an ‘expansive ecological time’, which, the 
authors argue, cannot be captured by the restricted ecology of modern and 
post- modern time fostered by the MDIP project.
Based on a discussion of Gell (1992), Bear (2014), Elias (1994) and  Morton 
(2013) among others, the chapter offers novel perspectives on ecological 
processes, agricultural (non-urban) infrastructures and the temporality of 
ecological time. Alongside the chapter by Irvine which follows, Widger and 
Wickramasinghe enrich our understandings of chronocracy as a  process 
that involves human and non-human beings, objects (hyper- and other-
wise), materialities and ecologies. The manner in which the MDIP pro-
ject constitutes local farmers and their environments as being in need of 
 modernisation is reminiscent of the kind of denial of coevalness inherent in 
discourses and practices of urban development, investment and lending (see 
also  Ringel’s and Kirtsoglou’s contributions). As these narratives (and the 
structural adjustment projects within which they materialise) supposedly 
seek to reconcile incongruent temporalities, they actually impose a certain 
modern, industrial and post-industrial vision of synchronicity that effec-
tively denies coevalness at the most fundamental level.
The ways in which chronocracy produces asymmetrical relationships be-
tween humans and other organisms become even more profound in Irvine’s 
paper on the life-cycle of peats. In this contribution, the eco-cidal effects 
of denying coevalness to non-human organisms and ecological systems are 
laid bare. Irvine’s ethnography explains how peats are assemblages of living 
and decomposed matter that occupy a state in-between wet and dry, living 
and dying, growing and ancient. Peats have their own physical and biolog-
ical rhythms and life-cycles that become connected to the social rhythms 
and labour of people who use peat matter to produce heating bricks. As land 
gets drained for cultivation, however, its water is lost leading to the exposure 
of the formerly waterlogged peat to the air. “As water is withdrawn from a 
body of peat and air fills the spaces in it…chemical oxidations…bacterial 
and fungal attacks” kill the organic parts of the peat, effecting the loss of 
a form of natural habitat and the interruption of ecological time (Godwin 
1978: 126 in Irvine this volume).
Irvine’s ethnography contributes greatly to our understanding of 
 multi-temporality as a distributed property of the relations between human 
and non-human organisms and between ecologies and materialities. His 
contribution exposes chronocratic transformations of our ecosystems that 
establish temporal incongruence between human and non-human temporal 
rhythms. In a sense, Irvine gives us a bite-size insight into the enormity of 
the destructive workings of chronocracy in the Anthropocene. The view of 
ecological temporalities as fundamentally different and inferior to human 
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ones allows us to see chronocracy as a form of environmental colonialism. 
Attempts to dominate ecological time afford sedimentations of colonial 
practices (cf. Stoller 2016) and comprise a type of chronocracy that effects 
the ruination, destruction and necrosis of our environments and of non- 
human organisms. Irvine’s ethnographic engagement with this issue is a 
piece of significant academic counter-chronocratic labour that exposes the 
deleterious effects of the chronopolitics of non-coevalness for environmen-
tal systems and ultimately for the humans that live in them.
Returning to the theme of post-industrial, hegemonic visions of syn-
chronicity underpinned by notions of modernity as progress, the penul-
timate ethnographic contribution to the volume explores modernity as a 
historical product that encompasses multiple and seemingly contradictory 
fragments of European history, namely the protestant ethic, Aristotelian 
logic and an eschatological trust in progress as unavoidable telos. Through 
an ethnographic exploration of austerity in Greece, Kirtsoglou identifies 
crisis as a chronocratic technique that serves to produce and normalise tem-
poral incongruence. Notions of crisis and emergency underpin austerity 
measures and structural adjustments that citizens have to endure in order 
to overcome the financial crisis through modernisation. Synchronicity as 
modernisation becomes a moral imperative which produces ‘anticipatory 
nostalgia’ (cf. Herzfeld 1997; Berliner 2015; Theodossopoulos 2016b and this 
volume). Anticipatory nostalgia in Greece highlights the nation’s glorious 
classical past and simultaneously takes the form of a longing for a compa-
rably outstanding future that is yet to come. This view of the nation as the 
cradle of the principles of modernity (through its heritage) and at once as 
lagging in modernisation constitutes the present as a ruinated timescape, a 
sad and parochial, collectively mourned parenthesis.
This contribution demonstrates how chronocracy is implicated in struc-
tures and formal calendrics of debt (cf. Williams 2004; Guyer 2007; Han 
2012) and how it produces the phenomena of ruination (Navaro-Yashin 2102), 
loss (Demetriou 2018) and exhaustion (Knight 2016; Bryant and Knight 
2019). In the specific case of Greece, chronocratic narratives of  temporal 
incongruence accentuate the politics of nostalgia through the  circulation 
of  aetiologies that emphasised the degenerate character of  modern Greeks. 
The painful austerity measures imposed on the country became the vehicle 
that would transport the Greek people simultaneously back (in the glory 
of their classical heritage) and forward (in the much desired state of being 
modern). Austerity left the country in a normalised state of emergency. In 
this liminal chronotope, modern Greeks continue to stand – as if in the 
antechambers of history or possibly a newly fashioned ‘waiting room’ – 
while their future progress (and their future as progress) is politically en-
gineered by international institutional actors making critical decisions at 
the margins of the state (cf. Das 1995; Knight and Stewart 2016: 10 and our 
earlier discussion of Laszczkowski’s contribution). Apart from evidencing 
the role of chronocracy in fostering relations of inequality and exploitation, 
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Kirtsoglou also documents grassroots counter-chronocratic acts of fiscal 
disobedience (cf. Roitman 2005) and the role of affect in the chronopolitics 
of (lack of) coevalness.
The theme of nostalgia and its relations to allochronism is also elucidated 
in the contribution offered by Theodossopoulos, which brings our discus-
sion full circle. Through an astute critique of ethnographic practice, the au-
thor explains the workings of ‘ethnographic nostalgia’ and contributes to 
long-standing methodological debates on allochronism in the social sciences 
(cf. Agnew 1996; Klinke 2013; Pandian 2012; Stewart 2016 indicatively). The-
odossopoulos defines ethnographic nostalgia as an analytical concept that 
‘structures the effect of previous ethnographic knowledge on ethnographic 
production in the present’ (cf. Theodossopoulos 2016a, 2016b). He attests 
to the multi-temporal, intertextual character of ethnography, but he also 
demonstrates how ethnographies become temporalised and turn into ‘in-
formative’ and ‘authoritative’ records that pre-empt ethnographic futures 
and fill them with all sorts of distortions and allochronic biases. This con-
tribution facilitates further our understanding of epistemic chronocracy, 
both through a fresh reading of allochronism as an effect of ethnographic 
nostalgia and through a careful deconstruction of what constitutes progress 
in anthropological writing – turns which are in fact returns (cf. Navaro- 
Yashin 2009: 7 and our earlier discussion of Ringel’s contribution). The cri-
sis of representation, Theodossopoulos argues, created – against our better 
judgement – an allochronic trap: ‘it has temporalized its critical age’, relo-
cating the problem of representation in past timelines supposedly closed 
hermetically from our own. The assumption that methodological problems, 
once identified, can be fixed and become a thing of the past leaves the back 
door wide open to allochronism as epistemic chronocracy. In combination 
with Jackson’s paper, our introduction and the insights that Ringel offers on 
change, this contribution speaks to wider debates on the structuring effects 
of regimes of expert knowledge (cf. Koselleck 1985; Klinke 2013; Bear 2016; 
Yarrow 2017) and comprises the methodological contribution of this volume 
to current literatures on the anthropology of time.
Just before we pass the torch…
Endorsing Bear’s (2016) useful categorisation of the varieties of temporal 
representations, we have demonstrated that chronocracy manifests itself in 
economico-political technologies of instituting inequality around the world, 
in epistemic hierarchies of knowledge that have allochronic effects, and as a 
counter-ethic that creates asymmetrical moral economies. We have argued 
that chronocracy can be animated by affect; it is built into practices and 
materialities; it is productive not only of new concepts and superior truths 
but also of biopolitical, thanatopolitical and eco-cidal processes of govern-
ance. We proposed that we can view chronocracy as a temporal adaptation 
of the distinction between zoe as bare life, collectively lived in the same ‘real’ 
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time, and bios as social and political existence that has been subjected to 
hierarchical temporalisation. The world, we have claimed, has become a 
fragmented place; not only in historical, economic, political and geopolit-
ical ways but also, perhaps more crucially, in a temporal sense. Temporal 
incongruence is a central problem of our time as it creates multiple ten-
sions and asynchronicities between open-ended and circumscribed views 
of the world. In all of its political, epistemic and moral manifestations and 
in its discursive, practical, affective and material facets, chronocracy pro-
duces and underpins the diverse non-coeval timescapes we inhabit. Spatio- 
temporal asymmetries between these timescapes force people to live in the 
timelines of others, or worse, to inhabit various appendices of time, locked 
in structures of waiting for, and in postponed presents.
Inspired by Veena Das’ (2006) work, we have observed that chronocracy 
has scalar properties, and as anthropologists, we are best equipped to study 
it through a descent into the everyday and the ordinary. This is because, as 
all other forms of violence, chronocracy saturates our everyday existence, 
and from there, it is capable of fleshing out the sinister side of our most 
positive faculties like imagination, creativity, potentiality, immanence and 
agency. When chronocracy becomes imaginative it finds all sorts of new 
and creative ways of planting itself in our worlds. It turns potentiality and 
immanence into insecurity, it converts endurance and maintenance into 
stagnation, it adjusts development and growth into tyrannical structures 
of accumulation, exploitation and ecologic destruction, it makes hope feel 
like a waiting room. Hijacked by chronocracy, hope becomes a timescape 
composed of the ruins of our present, of our dead dreams and of closed-off 
possibilities that may one day re-open. Who knows when and how? We must 
be wary of chronocracy we claim; not only because we so often stumble on 
it and fall flat on our faces but also because of its intimate connection to our 
own agency. Time is us (to remember Gell) and chronocracy is our affective, 
historical, political and epistemic counter-morality. It is an example of the 
dark side of our radical imagination (cf. Kirtsoglou 2010b, 2011, 2018); of 
our immense potential to transform but also to dis-locate, to corrupt and 
to colonise our own existence and the existence of other species and of our 
ecologies in all kinds of ways (as human beings we individually and collec-
tively come up with all sorts of ethical and affirmative, but also violent and 
damaging customs!).
In some ways, this volume is about temporal dis-locations and the re- 
location of human and non-human beings in coeval spatiotemporal 
ecologies. What would a decolonising ethical orientation to this denial 
of coevalness look like? We have tried to show that the synchronicity of 
 modernity is not the place to begin but rather a more fundamental belief in 
the temporal and political equality of diverse ontologies. This is, of course, 
no easy matter. It is not even a matter of writing an academic piece of work 
but a problem that requires continuous and hard labour at all levels of life. 
The present collection is an exercise in multi-temporal inter-textuality. As 
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such, it is filled with ancestral guiding spirits, the echoes of a conference 
past, the hard work of other anthropologists and that of its contributors, 
anticipations of a less chronocratic future and hopes that it does not itself 
become somehow part of chronocracy. Ultimately, it is just another act of 
academic labour, another turn of Archimedes’ screw and another bead on 
the string which is the time of anthropology. We offer it in good heart and in 
full knowledge that, despite our best intentions, it will not solve the funda-
mental problem it identifies. If we don’t have better answers we hope that at 
least we have come up with better questions.
Note
 1 See Aristotle, Περί Ψυχής, Athens: Fexis, 1911 edition.
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